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Patyurasamanjasyat II.2.37
(208)
The Lord (cannot be the efficient
or the operative cause of the world) on account of the inconsistency
(of that doctrine).
Patyuh: of the Lord, of Pasupati, of the Lord of animals; Asamanjasyat:
on account of inconsistency, on account of untenableness, inappropriateness.
The Pasupatas or the Mahesvaras are divided into four classes, viz.,
Kapala, Kalamukha, Pasupata and Saiva. Their scripture describes five
categories, viz., Cause (Karana), Effect (Karya), Union (Yoga by the
practice of meditation), Ritual (Vidhi) and the end of pain or sorrow
(Duhkhanta), i.e., the final emancipation. Their categories were revealed
by the great Lord Pasupati Himself in order to break the bonds of the
soul called herein Pasu or animal.
In this system Pasupati is the operative or the efficient cause (Nimitta
Karana). Mahat and the rest are the effects. Union means union with
Pasupati, their God, through abstract meditation. Their rituals consist
of bathing thrice a day, smearing the forehead with ashes, interturning
the fingers in religious worship (Mudra), wearing Rudraksha on the neck
and arms, taking food in a human skull, smearing the body with ashes
of a burnt human body, worshipping the deity immersed in a wine-vessel.
By worshipping the Pasupati the soul attains proximity with the Lord,
and there accrues a state of cessation of all desires and all pains
which is Moksha.
The followers of this school recognise God as the efficient or the operative
cause. They recognise the primordial matter as the material cause of
the world. This theory is contrary to the view of the Sruti where Brahman
is stated to be both the efficient and the material cause of the world.
Hence the theory of Pasupatas cannot be accepted.
According to Vedanta, the Lord is both the efficient and the material
cause of the universe. The Naiyayikas, Vaiseshikas, Yogins and Mahesvaras
say that the Lord is the efficient cause only and the material cause
is either the atoms, according to the Naiyayikas and Vaiseshikas, or
the Pradhana, according to the Yogins and Mahesvaras. He is the ruler
of the Pradhana and the souls which are different from Him.
This view is wrong and inconsistent. Because God will be partial to
some and prejudiced against others. Because some are prosperous, while
others are miserable in this universe. You cannot explain this saying
that such difference is due to diversity of Karma, for if the Lord directs
Karma, they will become mutually dependent. You cannot explain this
on the ground of beginninglessness, for the defect of mutual dependence
will persist.
Your doctrine is inappropriate because you hold the Lord to be a special
kind of soul. From this it follows that He must be devoid of all activity.
The Sutrakara himself has proved in the previous Section of this book
that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world
(efficient or the operative cause).
It is impossible that the Lord should be the mere efficient cause of
the world, because His connection with the world cannot be established.
In ordinary worldly life we see that a potter who is merely the efficient
cause of the pot has a certain connection with the clay with which he
fashions the pot.
The Srutis emphatically declare 'I will become many' (Tait. Up. II.6).
This indicates that the Lord is both the efficient and the material
cause of the universe.
Sambandhanupapattescha
II.2.38 (209)
And because relation (between
the Lord and the Pradhana or the souls) is not possible.
Sambandha: relation; Anupapatteh: because of the impossibility;
Cha: and.
The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.
A Lord who is distinct from the Pradhana and the souls cannot be the
ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way.
It cannot be conjunction (Samyoga), because the Lord, the Pradhana and
the souls are of infinite extent and destitute of parts. Hence they
cannot be ruled by Him.
There could not be Samavaya-sambandha (inherence) which subsists between
entities inseparably connected as whole and part, substance and attributes
etc., (as in the case of Tantu-pata, thread and cloth), because it would
be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding
thing.
The difficulty does not arise in the case of the Vedantins. They say
that Brahman is Abhinna-Nimitta-Upadana, the efficient cause and the
material cause of the world. They affirm Tadatmya- sambandha (relation
of identity). Further they depend on the Srutis for their authority.
They define the nature of the cause and so on, on the basis of Sruti.
They are, therefore, not obliged to render their tenets entirely conformable
to observation as the opponents have to.
The Pasupatas cannot say that they have the support of the Agama (Tantras)
for affirming Omniscience about God. Such a statement suffers from the
defect of a logical see-saw (petitio principii), because the
omniscience of the Lord is established on the doctrine of the scripture
and the authority of the scripture is again established on the omniscience
of the Lord.
For all these reasons, such doctrines of Sankhyayoga about the Lord
is devoid of foundation and is incorrect. Other similar doctrines which
likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding
arguments.
Adhishthananupapattescha II.2.39
(210)
And on account of the impossibility
of rulership (on the part of the Lord).
Adhisthana: rulership; Anupapatteh: because of the impossibility;
Cha: and.
The argument against the Pasupata view is continued.
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers, such as Naiyayikas, etc.,
is untenable hypothesis. There is another logical fallacy in the Nyaya
conception of Isvara. They say that the Lord creates the world with
the help of Pradhana, etc., just as a potter makes pots with the mud.
But this cannot be admitted, because the Pradhana which is devoid of
colour and other qualities and therefore not an object of perception,
is on that account of an entirely different nature from clay and the
like. Therefore, it cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's
action. The Lord cannot direct the Pradhana.
There is another meaning also for this Sutra. In this world we see a
king with a body and never a king without a body. Therefore, the Lord
also must have a body which will serve as the substratum of his organs.
How can we ascribe a body to the Lord, because a body is only posterior
to creation?
The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because he is devoid of a material
substratum, because experience teaches us that action needs a material
substratum. If we assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body which
serves as a substratum for his organs prior to creation, this assumption
also will not do, because if the Lord has a body He is subject to the
sensations of the ordinary souls and thus no longer is the Lord.
The Lord's putting on a body also cannot be established. So the Lord
of animals (Pasupati) cannot be the ruler of matter (Pradhana). That
by putting on a body the Lord becomes the efficient cause of the world
is also fallacious. In the world it is observed that a potter having
a bodily form fashions a pot with the clay. If from this analogy the
Lord is inferred to be the efficient cause of the world, He is to be
admitted to have a bodily form. But all bodies are perishable. Even
the Pasupatas admit that the Lord is eternal. It is untenable that the
eternal Lord resides in a perishable body and so becomes dependent on
another additional cause. Hence it cannot be inferred that the Lord
has any bodily form.
There is still another meaning. Further, there is in his case the impossibility
(absence) of place. For an agent like the potter etc., stands on the
ground and does his work. He has a place to stand upon. Pasupati does
not possess that.
Karanavacchenna bhogadibhyah
II.2.40 (211)
If it be said (that the Lord
rules the Pradhana etc.,) just as (the Jiva rules) the senses (which
are also not perceived), (we say) no, because of the enjoyment, etc.
Karanavat: like the senses; Chet: if, if it be conceived.
Na: not (no it cannot be accepted); Bhogadibhyah: because
of enjoyment, etc.
An objection against Sutra 38 is raised and refuted.
The Sutra consists of two parts, namely an argument and its reply. The
argument is 'Karanavacchet' and the reply is 'Na bhogadibhyah'.
The opponent says: Just as the individual soul rules the sense organs
which are not perceived, so also the Lord rules the Pradhana, etc.
The analogy is not correct, because the individual soul feels pleasure
and pain. If the analogy be true, the Lord also would experience pleasure
and pain, caused by the Pradhana etc., and hence would forfeit His Godhead.
Antavattvamasarvajnata
va II.2.41 (212)
(There would follow from their
doctrine the Lord's) being subject to destruction or His non-omniscience.
Antavattvam: finiteness, terminableness, subject to destruction;
Asarvajnata: absence of Omniscience; Va: or.
The argument raised in Sutra 40 is further refuted and thus the Pasupata
doctrine is refuted.
According to these schools (Nyaya, Pasupata, the Mahesvara, etc.), the
Lord is Omniscient and eternal. The Lord, the Pradhana and the souls
are infinite and separate. Does the Omniscient Lord know the measure
of the Pradhana, soul and Himself or not? If the Lord knows their measure,
they all are limited. Therefore a time will come when they will all
cease to exist. If Samsara ends and thus there is no more Pradhana,
of what can God be the basis or His lordship? Or, over what is His Omniscience
to extend? If nature and souls are finite, they must have a beginning.
If they have a beginning and end, there will be scope for Sunyavada,
the doctrine of nothingness. If He does not know them, then he would
no longer be Omniscient. In either case the doctrine of the Lord's being
the mere efficient cause of the world is untenable, inconsistent and
unacceptable.
If God be admitted to have organs of senses and so to be subject to
pleasure and pain, as stated in Sutra 40, He is subject to birth and
death like an ordinary man. He becomes devoid of Omniscience. This sort
of God is not accepted by the Pasupatas even. Hence the doctrine of
the Pasupatas, that God is not the material cause of the world cannot
be accepted.
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