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by Swami Krishnananda
But there are also purely mental perceptions wherein the functions of the senses are not involved. Objects which are perceived in dream, and the beloved who is perceived near him by a lover who is overpowered by passion, while in fact she is far away from him, are instances of mental hallucinations in which the cognising mind projects its conditions outside into space and perceives them as real objects. In this form of error, memory is the one factor which brings about the perception. Erroneous perception, therefore, can be caused by the perception of similar objects, e.g. brightness common to silver and nacre, or length, softness, etc. common to snake and rope; characters common to quadrupeds, such as are perceived in a cow and a horse; by movement of objects like the firebrand or a boat in a river; by distance as in the case of the perception of the smallness of the moon; by lack of sufficient light; by defective sense-organs like the eye affected by cataract on account of which there is a splitting of light rays issuing from the eyes, causing the perception of two moons; by experience of passions like lust, anger, grief, etc.; by one’s being accustomed to perceive the same object frequently; by a half-sleepy state of the mind; by too much brooding over an object; by imbalance of bodily humours; and also by the result of actions of past birth. In mental erroneous perception, like dream-experience, the memory images are projected outside by being invested with spatiality and objectiveness. In sensory illusions like the perception of silver in nacre or beauty in an object of love, there is a superimposition of memory images and mental conditions on really existing external objects.
The different schools of philosophy have advanced different theories of error in accordance with their avowed theories of knowledge. These theories concerning the nature of erroneous perception are technically called Khyatis. There are six important Khyatis in Indian philosophy. They are: 1. Satkhyati, 2. Akhyati, 3. Anyathakhyati, 4. Atmakhyati, 5. Asatkhyati, and 6. Anirvachaniyakhyati.
The theory of Satkhyati is held by Ramanuja and his followers. According to this theory, there is no error in fact. What is experienced is real. Satkhyati, Akhyati and Anyathakhyati may be brought under the general head Satkhyati, which is in opposition to Asatkhyati. But the general theory of Satkhyati as advocated by Ramanuja’s system holds the view that in wrong knowledge there is cognition of some kind of reality or existence. In essence, even Atmakhyati may come under Satkhyati, for it admits the reality of cognition within. The theory of Asatkhyati is advanced by the Madhyamikas or Sunyavadins who hold that in wrong knowledge there is cognition of unreality or non-existence. The Anirvachaniyakhyati is the view of the Advaitin, that objects experienced are indeterminable, and that the object of erroneous cognition is neither real, nor unreal, nor real-unreal, i.e. it is Sadasadvilakshana. Atmakhyati is the theory of the Vijnanavadins, the Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas,—having different theories of perception,—that the internal concept appears as the external percept, in erroneous cognition. Akhyati is the theory of the Sankhya, Yoga and the Prabhakara school of Purva-Mimamsa, according to which there is, in error, non-distinction between a memory image and a percept. Anyathakhyati is the view of the Nyaya, Vaiseshika and Kumarila Bhatta’s school of Purva-Mimamsa, and this holds that the substratum and the percept of erroneous cognition are real independently.
Statement: According to Satkhyati, all objects exist independent of the knowledge which others have of them. The non-existent cannot be perceived. Truth is the correspondence between knowledge and an object which has independent existence. The erroneous cognition of silver in nacre is not really the cognition of something unreal, as such, for it refers to something which exists. The elements of silver that are contained in nacre are responsible for the perception of silver in nacre, though these elements require the aid of a peculiar constitution of the perceiving sense-organs. Though erroneous judgment may be due to defective sense-organs, the absolutely non-existent cannot be perceived at any time. As, by the process of quintuplication, every element contains parts of other elements, it is possible that anything can contain any other thing. Even the perception of yellow colour in things by a person affected with jaundice is not the perception of some colour which is really not in objects, but of what all objects possess in some degree, though this cannot be perceived by all eyes. The eye which is affected with jaundice, being favourably conditioned, can see it. Hence the distinction which is ordinarily made between truth and error does not really exist. But in order that truth may be practically useful in life, it should correspond not merely to some existent thing, in some degree, but to the element which is preponderating over others in that object which is perceived. Hence only those elements which, being commonly predominant in things, are equally perceived by all others also, can alone be really useful in life. When something is perceived only by one individual, privately, and not by others, it becomes the so-called unreal or the illusory. But even the content of this private perception by an individual has existence, though it cannot be seen by others. What is called correction of error is not the negation of what is existent, but only the cessation of effort in regard to the non-predominant element in the object.
Refutation: In quintuplication, the gross physical elements are not quintuplicated; only the subtle rudimentary principles of these elements are quintuplicated. Else, one would perceive silver in a pillar of stone. The constituents of nacre and silver are not mixed up in one object. If silver is really contained in nacre, the silver part of the nacre should melt when the nacre is thrown into fire. A snake is not present in the rope as one of the constituents of the latter.
Statement: The theory of Akhyati holds that the inability to discriminate (Aviveka) between cognitions of different kinds and between their corresponding objects is error. Error is not the perception of something existent, but the non-perception of difference between different cognitions of different characteristics and contents. The two cognitions are real, independently, without reference to each other. In the perception of silver in nacre, the perception of ‘Idamta’ or ‘thisness’ is true perception, but the vision of the silver is only a memory of what was previously perceived. The non-perception of the difference between the two real distincts is due to some defect in perception. Perception and memory, the object of perception and the object of memory, are different from one another. But this difference is not perceived in erroneous perception. Memory is mistaken for perception. As there is this inherent mistake in perception, it does not lead to successful activity corresponding to the perception. Correction of error is the subsequent consciousness of the distinction between what is perceived (e.g. nacre) and what is merely remembered (e.g. silver). But in correction there is no cancellation of either nacre or silver; only the distinction between them and that of perception from memory are recognised. In perception through a jaundiced eye the distinction between the yellowness of the bile and the real colour of the object perceived is not seen. Really speaking, there is no such thing as absolute error. The so-called error is only the absence of the recognition of the true relation between the two elements in knowledge. But the contents of knowledge are never unreal or false. Truth may not be known fully, but there cannot be, strictly speaking, knowledge of untruth or falsehood.
Refutation: The Purvapakshin admits that the perception of an object implies the perception of the difference of that object from another object. There is the negation of cloth in a pot, and vice versa, and without this negation being implied in the perception of a cloth or a pot, neither of these can be perceived. And the perception of distinction is the same as that of reciprocal relationship among objects. Distinction is the essential nature of every object. Without the perception of distinction, there is no perception at all. Hence it is not true that the distinction between nacre and silver is not cognised, though the two objects are cognised in perception and memory, respectively. As knowledge is accepted to be self-luminous, the moment it is manifest it should reveal difference. And when any object is known, its distinction from other objects should also be known simultaneously. Thus, the possibility of the non-cognition of difference does not arise.
Further, it is not true that the non-discrimination between percept and memory obtains in all forms of experience. In dream when, really, all experience is only a memory, except that of the self which alone is known directly, a distinction between this direct experience and memory is made; else, there would not be perception of dream objects. If the object seen in dream as a memory-image is non-distinguished from direct experience, one would have the knowledge ‘I am the object,’ and not ‘this is the object.’ It cannot also be said that two memory-images are non-distinguished in error, for, in that case, there would be no experience of error.
Statement: According to Anyathakhyati, error is not the non-distinction between a percept and a memory or between their contents. The silver that is seen in nacre is not a mere memory. A memory-image cannot be directly perceived. But it is true that the silver that is seen in nacre is not really where it is seen. If the silver seen in nacre were absolutely unreal, there would be no perception of silver at all. An absolutely non-existent entity cannot be perceived as existent. But it is also true that the silver in question is not actually present in the nacre. This is proved by the failure of this silver to conform to practical workability and utility. Error is the cognition of a composite situation brought about by a kind of subsistence of silverness in the ‘thisness’ (Idamta) in cognition.
The fact is that nacre, in erroneous perception, is not perceived as it is. It is not the character of nacre but the ‘thisness’ of nacre with a quality of glittering that is perceived in such error. A memory of silver arises in the mind of the perceiver when the character of glittering which is attributed to silver is perceived. Now, what is perceived wrongly is neither nacre fully nor silver really, but the ‘thisness’ of nacre with the quality of silverness attributed to the fact of glittering. So, what is known is not merely a memory of silver, but the silver existing somewhere else brought into relationship with the perceiving eye by the memory arisen in the mind. Really, it is a relation that is there, but it gets identifies with actual perception due to memory. Though the relation between the ‘thisness’ and the eye is ordinary, the relation between the silver and the eye is extraordinary, and not natural. But some kind of relation obtains between two things in erroneous cognition. Though nacre is not silver, it appears to the eye as silver, through the extraordinary relation mentioned above.
In erroneous cognition two factors are involved: One that is ‘there’ and the other that is ‘not there,’ observed by the eye through the natural and the non-natural relations of the contents with the eye. In the correction of error, what is negated is not silver itself, but the supposed relation between the ‘thisness’ and the silver. What is negated is not a non-existent silver, for the non-existent cannot be seen. The silver must exist somewhere. And it must be somewhere else, for its negation is experienced in the correction of error.
Refutation: In erroneous cognition silver does not appear as a distant object, but is identified with something which is existent before the eyes. The existence of silver somewhere else has no bearing on the silver that is perceived in nacre. The so-called actual perception of silver in erroneous judgment is only an appearance of silver, and for this a really existent silver is unnecessary. Moreover, when the error is corrected, one feels: ‘This is not silver,’ and not ‘there is no relation between the thisness of this nacre and the distant silver.’ What is cancelled in correction is the silver perceived there and not merely a relation of silver with ‘thisness.’ And a relation which is unreal cannot, according to the Anyathakhyativadin himself, be negated; and if it is real, it cannot, again, be negated. And further, the admission of extraordinary perception makes inference useless, for the process of extraordinary perception can be applied to inference, and vice versa.
Statement: According to this theory, the silver perceived in nacre is not silver really existing somewhere outside. This silver is real as an object of internal cognition, but unreal as an object of external perception. It is not absolutely non-existent, for it is perceived. It has subjective existence and objective non-existence. This silver is an object of the mind and not of the senses. It is ideal and not real, psychological and not physical; and error is the projecting outward, as a material object, of the internal mental concept which is non-material. In error, the mental is mistaken for the material. In the correction of error, it is not the silver that is negated, but only its apparent externality of being. In correct perception (i.e. of nacre after the removal of error), the silver is recognised as an internal concept. The Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas accept that there is an externally real basis, the ‘this,’ the former holding that this basis is directly perceived, and the latter that it is only inferred. But both these admit that the silver perceived in nacre is projected from within on the external substratum, whether this substratum is perceived or inferred. The Vijnanavadins hold that there is nothing externally real, and that the cognised object is only cognition externalised by error. They hold that there is non-distinction, at the time of cognition, between cognition and the cognised, which proves that the cognised is cognition itself.
Refutation: That the cognised and cognition are non-distinct is not a fact. The cognition of the cognised and the existence of the cognised at the time of cognition naturally appear to be simultaneous; but simultaneity is not identity. The manifestation of light and the revelation of an object with its aid are simultaneous events; but light and the object are not identical with each other. The cognitive consciousness cannot be said to be the same as the cognised object. How can something appear outside when there is nothing outside? There cannot be an appearance without some reality underlying it. We can have changing cognitions of the same object, and also more than one object can be cognised by the same cognitive consciousness. This proves that objects outside are not mere internal cognitions. Objects exist prior to their perception; objects are in space outside, while the cognitive consciousness is within. There is thus a temporal and spatial distinction between cognition and its objects. Moreover, there would be no distinction between truth and error, if all objects were mental. Something independent of cognition has to be admitted if truth is to be distinguished from error. Without this independent existence, there cannot be common perception of things by all alike, and thus there would be no such thing as truth, other than private fancy. But common perception disproves the Vijnanavada position of the ideality of external things.