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by Swami Krishnananda
Statement: This theory holds that what is cognised in erroneous cognition is absolutely non-existent. If the silver perceived in nacre were real, it could not be sublated afterwards on correct perception. As silver seen in erroneous perception is not seen in correct perception, it is clear that the silver of the erroneous perception does not really exist. Due to the power of Avidya or ignorance, cognition manifests a non-existent silver. The impression of the previous perception of silver becomes responsible for the perception of an appearance of silver in erroneous judgment. As correction of error reveals the non-existence of silver in nacre, we have to conclude that Sunya or the non-existent is the object of erroneous cognition.
Refutation: Avidya cannot create the non-existent silver, for the non-existent cannot be created at any time. If the unreal does not even appear, it is not possible even to say that the unreal does not appear, as one cannot say: ‘My mother is barren.’ Further, cognition which is the substratum of Avidya cannot be caused by Avidya to manifest an unreal object. The cause cannot be directed or influenced by the effect. Hence, cognition possessing the power of Avidya cannot produce the non-existent silver in nacre. And, moreover, no kind of relation can be established between cognition and silver, for there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent. Without a relation between the cognition and the object cognised, no cognition is possible. What is cognised in erroneous cognition is not the non-existent, and not also the truly existent, but only an appearance or Pratibhasikasatta which is devoid of Vyavaharikasatta or practical reality and value. The illusion of Vyavaharikata in Pratibhasikata is cancelled in correction of error, but it is not true that even Pratibhasikata is absent in erroneous cognition. The Pratibhasikasatta appears as an external object, and not merely as a notion or an idea within. Objective reality is of two kinds: Vyavaharika and Pratibhasika. The latter is called the unreal in practical life. Mistaking this latter for the former is error. Error is corrected when the objective basis (Vyavaharikasatta) of the appearance (Pratibhasikasatta) is discovered in one’s cognitive consciousness.
The Anirvachaniyakhyati, which is the theory of the Advaitin, is the logical conclusion arrived at through a criticism of the various other views on error. The silver seen in nacre is neither real, nor a memory, nor existent somewhere else, nor an internal idea, nor absolutely nonexistent like a human horn. This silver is not different from the real alone, not different from the unreal alone, and not different from both the real and the unreal alone. One cannot definitely describe the nature of the silver perceived in nacre. It is not real, for it is sublated. It is not unreal, for it is perceived. It is not both real and unreal, for this is self-contradictory. Hence the silver in nacre is Anirvachaniya, indeterminable. Objects which have Pratibhasikasatta have the characteristics of indeterminability mentioned above,—they are Anirvachaniya. The indeterminability of appearances like this, which do not conform to the laws of empirical action, is of one kind, and can be said to constitute empirical error; and the indeterminability of the objects of correct perception in waking life is of a different kind altogether, and can be said to constitute transcendental error. This latter can be understood only through reason, scripture and direct realisation. The indeterminability of the nature of the world of waking life is explained by the admission in life of a distinction between empirical reality (Vyavaharikasatta) and absolute Reality (Paramarthikasatta). With reference to Vyavaharikasatta, Pratibhasikasatta is Anirvachaniya; and with reference to Paramarthikasatta, Vyavaharikasatta is Anirvachaniya. It is quite obvious that anything which cannot be called either real or unreal or real-unreal must be called indeterminable.
The Anirvachaniya character of silver perceived in nacre can be established by the Arthapatti mode of proof (postulation). The silver in question, as it has been shown above, is not real. It is not unreal. And it is not also real-unreal. So it ought to be indeterminable. This is the process of Arthapatti. What other relation than Anirvachaniyatva can obtain between reality and appearance? Yet, this Anirvachaniyasatta has an objective basis. In the case of empirical erroneous cognition, e.g. the cognition of silver in nacre, this basis is nacre. In transcendental erroneous cognition, i.e. the cognition of the universe in Brahman, the basis is Brahman. The object in empirical error is cognised due to a psychological error; and the basis for this cognised object is a physical object which is empirically real. The object in transcendental error is cognised due to a metaphysical error; and the basis for this cognised object is Brahman which is absolutely real.
The unreality of silver in nacre is different from the unreality of such things as a man’s horn. The latter cannot be perceived, for it is never manifest in experience, while the former is perceived, and it has some sort of objective existence. It has Pratibhasikasatta which a man’s horn does not have. But this Pratibhasikasatta has no Vyavaharikasatta, and so it is negatived in correct perception, i.e. in the perception of nacre as such. Silver in nacre is an Anirvachaniya-vastu. Even the nacre as such does not have Paramarthikasatta, and so it, too, gets negatived in the knowledge of Brahman. Nacre as such, also, is an Anirvachaniya-vastu. The Anirvachaniya is not the absolutely non-existent, but the indefinable empirical and the apparent. The empirical belongs to Isvarasrishti and is the product of Maya, while the apparent belongs to Jivasrishti and is produced by Avidya.
The theories of Drishtisrishti (creation on perceiving) and Srishtidrishti (perception on creation) pertain to the Pratibhasika and Vyavaharika objects, in two different levels of perception. The silver perceived in nacre is Drishtisrishta (created on perception), for it exists only so long as it is seen, and it is created by perception caused by individual Avidya. But the nacre as such exists whether it is perceived by an individual or not. Hence it is independent of Drishtisrishti. As its perception is posterior to its existence, it is a case of Srishtidrishti. But this nacre is the product of the Drishti or perception of Isvara through the cosmic Maya. And nacre cannot exist when Isvaradrishti is withdrawn. It exists only so long as it is visualised by Isvara. Thus the Vyavaharikasatta is Drishtisrishta from the standpoint of Isvara, though it is the basis of Srishtidrishti from the standpoint of the Jiva. The Pratibhasikasatta is purely Drishtsrishta even from the point of view of the Jiva. When nacre is seen, the silver in it vanishes. When Brahman is realised, the universe in it is sublated. When Reality is known, the appearances superimposed on it disappear.
The fact that in the negation of error the silver perceived in nacre is found to be non-existent does not prove that the silver, at the time of its being perceived, was non-existent. As it has been already observed, the non-existent cannot manifest itself before the perceptive consciousness. The perceptions of dream are found to be non-existent during the waking state; but this does not prove that dream objects are absolutely non-existent, for they were experienced during dream. The Vedanta, therefore, makes a distinction between Pratibhasikasatta and Vyavaharikasatta. Silver in nacre and dream objects belong to the former category; nacre and all other objects of the universe belong to the latter.
Thus it is established that the silver appearing in nacre is Anirvachaniya. Otherwise, the perception and sublation of one and the same thing cannot be explained. In the same way, it is to be understood that the universe superimposed on Brahman is Anirvachaniya. Maya and Avidya are both Anirvachaniya; and what they manifest, also, should be regarded as Anirvachaniya (Essence of Vedanta: pp. 213-229).
Intuition is the direct apprehending act of consciousness. It is that power in the higher reaches of the mind which perceives the truth of things immediately, independent of sensation, reasoning, induction and deduction. Intuition may be the non-mediate apprehension by a subject of its own essence, of the reality of its conscious states, of other minds, of other objects in the world, or of abstract universals. Intuition is supersensory. It transcends sense, intellect and reason and constitutes the full blossoming of these lower faculties into perfection. Intuition is different from inspiration. The former is knowledge by entering into the very existence of the object that is known, however remote it may be, while the latter is a mental experience caused by the transmission of the qualities of a higher consciousness to the mind.
“Intuition is an active inner awareness of the immortal and blissful Self within. It is the eye of wisdom through which the sage senses in everything the unseen presence. It is the Divya-chakshus, Prajna-chakshus or the Jnana-chakshus through which the Yogi or the sage experiences the supreme vision of the all-pervading Atman or Brahman” (Precepts for Practice, p. 138). “Intuition, intuitive discernment, in fact, is the only touchstone of philosophy. The method of intuition is the only one of discerning the truth ultimately. Intuition is the method. Realisation or the Self is the goal. Without developing intuition the intellectual man remains imperfect and blind to the truth behind appearance” (Ibid. p. 141). Intuition is the ultimate source of all proofs of knowledge. Other ways of knowing, like sense-perception, inference and verbal testimony give us only an indirect knowledge. The highest revelation comes to the self by itself alone, independent of external instruments and other accessories needed in empirical knowledge. The highest truth can be given only in intuition. The deepest secrets of Nature are not matters of sensory or intellectual perception. Truths which are related to the innermost being of the universe can be known only in intuition in which there is no process of knowledge, but the being of the object known becomes the existence-content of consciousness. The immediacy of intuitive perception is different from the apparent non-mediacy of sense-perception. Knowledge in the waking and the dreaming states is knowledge by process, requiring a relation between the knower and the known. But in intuition the object of knowledge does not stand outside as something alien to it. It gets assimilated into the constitution of knowledge itself. By intuition we are assured of the inner meaning and significance of things, of a supernatural import in the structure of the universe. The highest form of intuition is the recognition of the Self by itself in all things. It is, in the words of Plato, a conversation of the soul with itself. The object of knowledge in intuition does not present itself as a not-self which requires to be known by any process of perceptive knowledge, but is in sympathy with the permanent nature of knowledge itself. Certain experiences are often called intuition, though they are rather inspirations than true intuition. The creative power of the unconscious mind is such that sometimes the rational activity of the mind goes on below the subliminal level. It can continue far below the threshold of consciousness, in sleep and dream, very often. The mind yields ready forms of ratiocination and solutions. This activity of the higher mind is an unconscious functioning of the expression of the soul at the background of every mental function. The workings of the mind do not permit conscious willing except in the limited form in which they manifest, and they brook no encroachment by reason. But intuition as developed in the spiritual field widens the scope of reason and makes conscious willing possible in the highest degree, and in every direction (Vide, Jnana-Yoga: pp. 54-62). In the lower forms of intuition a supersensory process of perception may make a superficial distinction between the knower and the known. But this distinction is without much difference, for this knowledge-distinction is really something like the difference observed between the different parts or stages of a current of flowing water. There is a flow of knowledge and a practical distinction between the knower and the known, but the fact of the assimilation of the existence of the object into knowledge abolishes in intuition all real distinction, in kind or characteristic. In the higher forms of intuition even this flow of knowledge towards an object ceases, for here the object is known in its true nature, as ultimately one with the consciousness. This is what happens in the intuition of the Absolute.